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THE DISINTERESTED
PERSON:
AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH TO
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION
BY JOEL SELIGMAN
I'

'.>

Recently I had the opportunity to apply an unused procedure in a shareholder
derivative litigation. In 1989 Michigan amended its Business Corporation Act to
allow a court under specified circumstances to appoint a "disinterested person" to
perform fact gathering functions similar to those of a German investigative judge. In
1991 I was appointed to be the disinterested person in a derivative litigation involving
Rospatch Corporation. The experience persuaded me that compared to litigation and
the special litigation committee, the disinterested person approach may often have
significant advantages in terms of reduction of litigation costs, procedual fairness, and
protection of shareholders.

I. THE DILEMMA OF THE DERIVATIVE ACTION

The shareholder derivative action is a device essentially to compensate shareholders for losses suffered as a result of officer or director violations of the duty of due
care or of the duty of loyalty. Shareholder derivative actions have long provided a
deterrent to some forms of corporate cupidity, restrained some wastes of assets, and
accumulated some of the winnings from litigation or settlements to the corporation for
the equitable protection of creditors as well as shareholders.

A longer, footnoted version of this article appears in 55 Law and Contemporary Problems
(Autumn, 1992). Excerpts reprinted by permission.
Author's Note: Let me express my gratitute for comments concerning an earlier draft of this
article to Professors Alfred F. Conard, John C. Coffee, Jr., James D. Cox, Merritt Fox, Richard
Friedman, Harvey Goldschmid, Samuel R. Gross, John H. Langbein, Richard 0. Lempert, Cyril
Moscow, and Roberta Romano.
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But these virtues are achieved at a price. A sizable share of the winnings from
derivative litigation go not to the corporation, but to plaintiffs' lawyers, feeding the
suspicion that the primary purpose of the derivative action is not to deter corporate
law violations, but to enrich the plaintiffs' bar. This is not novel. The same complaint
can be made of almost any aspect of plaintiffs' litigation ranging from malpractice
actions to environmental litigation. Alone, the notion that plaintiffs' attorneys do well
for themselves by doing good for others should not be decisive.
Three factors, however, combine with this traditional complaint to take on
greater significance in the case of the derivative action. First, the shareholder
derivative action is sometimes unnecessary. When material misrepresentations or
omissions can be alleged, essentially what can be done in a derivative suit often can
also be achieved through a direct federal securities law action. In these cases, the
deterrent value of the derivative suit, an important virtue, has been reduced because of
the increased use during the last three decades of the federal securities law antifraud
remedies. The winnings from these claims redound to the same outside shareholders
who often are the indirect victors in derivative litigation.
Second, the nature of both derivative and direct actions has grown increasingly
more complex in the last few decades. Typically federal securities law claims today
are joined to a pendent state fraud action, and often civil RICO and state consumer
claims as well. This means that discovery in a shareholder derivative action typically
begins with a very wide net capable of enveloping documents of the corporation, its
board of directors, its chief officers, its outside attorney, its outside auditor, and often
subsidiary or affiliated corporations. An old critique of the derivative claim that it is
extraordinarily expensive or extraordinarily disruptive has taken on a greater ring of
truth with the blunderbuss discovery that has recently become commonplace. When
this critique is combined with the increased hourly cost for attorneys, accountants,
and expert witnesses, the assertion that the derivative litigation can be "ruinous" to a
small or medium-sized business can not be entirely dismissed.
Third, there is a factor that verges on the historical accident. In the mid-1970s,
several hundred American corporations were found to have paid overseas "questionable payments" or "bribes." Some of these corporations' officers were also sued in
derivative claims. But these were somewhat unusual shareholder derivative suits.
The officers may have committed a legal or moral wrong, but they could often claim
that they did so to enrich their firms, not to mulct them.
The response of the law to these events, in effect, was revolutionary. To limit
the derivative claim a new technique often called "the special litigation committee"
arose. The purpose, expressed or implied, of the special litigation committee is to
terminate derivative claims.
This is not to say that the special litigation committee is without merits. It has
the practical virtue of being far less expensive and far less disruptive than the traditional derivative claim. On occasion it has also led to some changes in corporate
personnel, or some changes in corporate practice.
Moreover, the court in administering the shareholder derivative action through
the special litigation committee technique typically creates incentives to make the
process fairer. It requires that there be no adoption of the recommendation of a
special litigation committee unless the court is satisfied that all material evidence had
been discovered. It requires the special litigation committee to meet with plaintiffs'
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attorneys or witnesses recommended by the plaintiffs to ensure part of the adversarial
process is integrated into the special litigation committee investigation. The court can
take into account efforts by the corporation to voluntarily cleanse itself. The court can
also be more reluctant to grant dismissal if the personnel on the special litigation
committee appear to be biased, or the factual or legal analysis too crude or too simple.
These techniques give the court supervising the special litigation committee some
opportunities to improve the process while at the same time reducing the overall cost
to the corporation and the overall disruption of the corporation.

II. THE DISINTERESTED PERSON ALTERNATIVE

[T]HE KEY IS THAT THE
DISINTERESTED PERSON
PROCEDURE BEGINS FROM A
QUITE DIFFERENT EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED PREMISE THAN
THE SPECIAL LITIGATION
COMMITTEE.
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The Michigan "disinterested person" is an attractive alternative to both litigation
and the special litigation committee in shareholder derivative litigation. The Michigan Business Corporation Act defines a "disinterested person" to mean "a person who
is not a party to a derivative proceeding, or a person who is a party if the corporation
demonstrates that the claim asserted against the person is frivolous or insubstantial."
The Act also provides: "The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding if, on motion
by the corporation, the court finds that [one or more disinterested persons appointed
by the court] has made a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable
investigation upon which its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the
derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation .... If the determination is made [by one or more disinterested persons], the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving that the determination was not made in good faith or that the
investigation was not reasonable." The statute itself does not define the terms "best
interests of the corporation" or "reasonable investigation." Nor are these terms
defined in the few other states that have adopted similar statutes.
While the Michigan statute is not a jewel of definitional precision, the core
concept implicit in the disinterested person is reasonably clear. The person should be
a neutral fact finder similar to a trial court judge, a Bankruptcy Code examiner, or the
Federal courts' Master, rather than a corporate employee or agent.
This aspect alone of the disinterested person procedure is significant. One much
stressed criticism of the special litigation committee is the concern that directors
evaluating other directors will not be able to reach a disinterested judgment. This
concern has been variously expressed in terms of" 'there but for the grace of God
go I' empathy," "the danger of allowing the board of directors to appoint a few 'good
ol' boys' as a special litigation committee and to be accordingly whitewashed," or the
"structural bias" of a special litigation committee whose members were selected by
defendant-directors. However phrased, the problem posed by such directors on a
special litigation committee is an obvious one. As one North Carolina court observed,
"Not one committee, in all these instances, has decided to proceed with suit," even
though some had recognized the legal merit of the claims asserted.
A quite different consequence of appointing a disinterested person to evaluate a
plaintiffs claims in a derivative action is to ensure that the disinterested person's
evaluation is the equivalent of a conventional "business judgment." It essentially
involves the same type of disinterested or arm's length, cost-benefit analysis that a
board of directors might undertake before deciding whether to build a new plant or
introduce a new product. In contrast the courts in recent years have heard the complaint that a special litigation committee was not sufficiently independent or that its
legal analysis was biased.
The disinterested person procedure can also achieve the lower-cost and lessdisruption advantages of the special litigation committee, but the key is that the
disinterested person procedure begins from a quite different express or implied

premise than the special litigation committee. Where the appointment of a special
litigation committee will usually result in a recommendation to dismiss derivative
litigation, the disinterested person procedure has a more neutral purpose. The
procedure should provide a good faith, intellectually honest effort to evaluate the
merits of a derivative claim. The disinterested person should not invariably conclude
that derivative claims are meritless. The disinterested person should evaluate claims
on the merits for the purpose of determining whether or not a claim is in the best
interests of the corporation.
This change in purpose should lead to important refinements in what is meant
by the pivotal statutory terms "best interests of the corporation" and "reasonable
investigation."

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CORPORATION

The Michigan statute creating the disinterested person procedure does not
define the phrase "best interests of the corporation." Several special litigation
committee cases have defined this term.
A leading example is found in Joy v. North where Judge Winter wrote in part:
[T]he function of the court's review is to determine the balance of probabilities
as to likely future benefit to the corporation, not to render a decision on the
merits, fashion the appropriate legal principles or resolve issues of credibility .
. . . The court's function is thus not unlike a lawyer's determining what a case is
"worth" for purposes of settlement.
Where the court determines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the probability of a finding of liability are less tlian the costs to the
corporation in continuing the action, it should dismiss the case. The costs
which may properly be taken into account are attorney's fees and other out-ofpocket expenses related to the litigation and time spent by corporate personnel
preparing for and participating in the trial. ...
Judicial scrutiny of special litigation committee recommendations should
thus be limited to a comparison of the direct costs imposed upon the corporation by the litigation with the potential benefits . . .

THE DISINTERESTED PERSON
SHOULD EVALUATE CLAIMS ON
THE MERITS FOR THE PURPOSE OF

A refinement of the Joy v. North standard is appropriate for complex derivative
claims. None of the special litigation committee cases to date have addressed the
need for any form of intermediate process. The expectation is simply that the
committee will file a report at the conclusion of its investigation.
In my experience as a disinterested person analyzing derivative claims in
In re Rospatch Securities Litigation, I found that the best way I could make the
Joy v. North standard operational was by pursuing a three-tier investigation.
The Rospatch derivative complaint alleged 22 separate possible causes of
action.
First, after the plaintiffs had submitted all documents that they believed
supported their complaint, and I had received from the nominal defendant, Rospatch,
all requested documents, I concluded that 13 possible causes of action alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint did not warrant further investigation. These conclusions were
either based on the lack of sufficient documentary evidence to justify bringing the
case to a jury, or my determination that the possibility of winning the case was
remote.
Second, in Rospatch on the remaining causes of action, I conducted a fuller
factual and/or legal investigation. The purpose of this investigation was to determine
if there was any cause of action where I believed it was likely that the plaintiffs

DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A
CLAIM IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CORPORATION.

31

would present a case where (1) it was probable that there would be sufficient evidence
to go to a jury or other fact finder, and (2) the chances of prevailing before the jury or
other fact finder were greater than remote.
Third, on those causes of action where I concluded that the plaintiffs were likely
to present a case sufficient to go to a jury or other fact finder and the likelihood of
success was greater than remote, a cost-benefit analysis would normally be appropriate. Here one would need to analyze: Who is likely to be held liable in each cause of
action? What is the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on each cause of action?
What is a reasonable estimate of how much the corporation is likely to recover? What
is a reasonable estimate of the direct litigation expenses the corporation would have
to bear? Here the issue of a corporation's indemnification insurance may become
particularly relevant both because of the difficulties of collecting damages from
individual defendants and because specific types of claims involving intentional misconduct are not insurable.

REASONABLE

IT SEEMED PREFERABLE TO ME
IN ATTEMPTING TO CREATE AN
EVENHANDED DISINTERESTED
PERSON PROCESS TO INTEGRATE
THE MOST DESIRABLE ASPECTS
OF AN ADVERSARIAL PROCESS
INTO THE DISINTERESTED
PERSON'S INVESTIGATION.
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INVESTIGATION

The Michigan statute also does not amplify the concept of a "reasonable
investigation" through definition or Reporter's comments. Generally judicial authorities require a reasonable investigation recorded in "a thorough written record of the
investigation and its findings and recommendations." The investigation will usually
involve interviews, which may be recorded in a typewritten summary of each. The
investigation will also review relevant corporate, legal, and accounting documents.
An investigation, when appropriate, may also study prior work of the corporate audit
committee or prior depositions or examination transcripts taken in earlier proceedings.
However, to the extent that there is reliance on earlier work, the courts have required
its verification. In some instances, a special litigation committee also has met with
plaintiffs' counsel in the derivative or in related actions.
These special litigation committee precedents provide a good starting point for
analyzing the appropriate standards in a disinterested person investigation. What is
singularly missing from existing precedent, however, is an appreciation of the
psychological reality of a special litigation or disinterested person investigation.
Unlike a court or an adversarial deposition, the investigation is conducted typically
with a single investigator meeting with a potential witness and the counsel of the
witness. Many, if not most, witnesses will be defendants or allied with the defendants. The witnesses, whether coached or not, will take pains to appear reasonable.
The investigator will spend typically a considerable period of time interviewing the
most significant witnesses. There are none of the conventional devices found in
litigation to fortify the investigator's skepticism or, better phrased, appropriate
agnosticism. Unlike a trial or deposition, no opposing counsel is there to interpose a
hostile cross-examination or a timely objection. The investigator, when witnesses are
not under oath, has no real ability to effectively remind a witness of the penalties for
perjury. While an investigator can reach conclusions about the likelihood that a
witness will appear persuasive to a jury or other fact finder, this type of conclusion
arguably has little place in a final report. In sum the very nature of the proceeding is
biased in favor of not finding fault or minimizing fault.
It seemed preferable to me in attempting to create an evenhanded disinterested
person process to integrate the most desirable aspects of an adversarial process into
the disinterested person's investigation. In the Rospatch investigation this was
facilitated by the fact that virtually all relevant documents were stored in a documentary depository. This meant that I could direct that the plaintiffs, after a review of
these documents, submit to me all documents that they believed tended to support the
positions advocated in their complaint and a memorandum explaining the significance
of the documents produced.

After I had reviewed all of the plaintiffs' document submissions and other
documents that I received from Rospatch, I circulated to the parties a statement of
which issues I believed justified further investigation and which issues did not. After
that statement was circulated, the defendants were given the opportunity to forward
for my review all documents that they believed supported their positions with
memoranda explaining the significance of the documents they produced.
I took several steps to ensure that I did not merely receive relevant documents
but understood them. First, as mentioned, to assist me in evaluating the documents
provided by the parties, I offered both the plaintiffs and the defendants the opportunity to attach memoranda explaining the significance of the documents provided.
Second, I selected a consultant on accounting standards and the analysis of accounting
work papers. Third, I took other steps to ensure that I received a critical analysis of
the relevant accounting and auditing issues. For example, I interviewed the plaintiffs
in related direct litigation. Each of these individuals was an accountant who provided
me with an adversarial analysis of relevant accounting and auditing issues. I also
interviewed certain of the plaintiffs' probable fact witnesses and stated my willingness to receive affidavits from potential expert witnesses for either side. Fourth, on
several occasions I requested that the parties file briefs addressing specific questions
concerning the relevant legal and accounting standards to be applied in this case.
These procedures replicated some of the adversarial presentations likely to
occur at trial. I was able largely to obviate the legitimate concerns of both plaintiffs
and defendants that I would not discover all that I should or that I would not understand what I discovered.
At the same time a key advantage of the disinterested person procedure is that,
to a greater extent than the special litigation committee, it can limit the number of
intervi.ews and document production when, and if, it becomes clear that the plaintiffs
case is essentially without merit. Because the disinterested persort begins as a neutral
fault finder, his or her judgement should be entitled to greater weight in reaching this
type of conclusion than that of a special litigation committee.
Indeed, even when the plaintiff has filed a meritorious claim, economies can be
achieved because of the disinterested person's control over discovery.

•• • THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
POTENTIAL USE OF A
DISINTERESTED PERSON WILL
BE PROBABLY IN COMPLEX
FACT PATTERNS AND
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO
COMPLEX FACTS.

Ill. CONCLUSION

The procedures employed in the Rospatch derivative litigation were responsive
to the circumstances that the court and I faced in that case. In other contexts these
procedures may not be fully appropriate.
What makes the disinterested person approach, nonetheless, a desirable one is
that it provides the judiciary a new alternative to the resolution of shareholder
derivative litigation. Unlike the special litigation committee which, in my opinion,
has been fairly criticized for its overwhelming tendency to favor defendants, the
disinterested person procedure offers legislatures or the judiciary an opportunity to
employ a more neutral approach while at the same time preserving the advantages of
reduced cost and reduced disruption associated with the special litigation committee
approach. In relatively small corporations the disinterested person may also be
viewed as a bargain compared to the special litigation committee. The disinterested
person, if a lawyer, does not need to hire separate counsel and can perform a role in
trying to inspire settlements that would be more difficult for counsel to a special
litigation committee to perform.
Nonetheless, the most significant potential use of a disinterested person will be
probably in complex fact patterns and application of the law to complex facts. Here
the disinterested person can perform a useful "triage" role, distinguishing meritorious
from nonmeritorious claims and sharpening the understanding of the court and parties
with respect to the facts concerning meritorious claims. In contrast are cases involv-
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ing simpler fact patterns, where the need for a disinterested fact finder will usually
be slight.
With complex cases, a significant issue suggested by the Rospatch case is
whether the appointment of a disinterested person should solely be on a motion from
the corporation or also might be made by the court on its own initiative. Since the
corporation will normally bear the cost of the disinterested person, there is a principled basis for limiting the person's appointment to the corporation's motion. On
the other hand, the court will usually have a quite realistic sense of when this type of
procedure may simplify fact finding and conceivably inspire settlements.
On balance I believe the disinterested person model worked well in the
Rospatch case but the area where it seemed to be most in need of improvement would
be in strengthening the role of the disinterested person in helping inspire settlements.
It may well be that the disinterested person will be more effective in helping inspire
settlements only when he or she is joined by the judge in settlement or other periodic
conferences. Like much else in a procedure only employed once to date, this is an
area where a certain amount of trial and error will be appropriate.

Joel Seligman joined the University of Michigan Law faculty in
1987. His principal area of research and writing is securities
regulation, and he is currently writing a multi-volume treatise
on that subject with Harvard Law School's Louis Loss.
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